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SUPPLEMENTARY APPENDIX FOR
BORN WEAK, GROWING STRONG: ANTI-GOVERNMENT PROTESTS AS
A SIGNAL OF REBEL STRENGTH IN THE CONTEXT OF CIVIL WARS
1
21. Appendix: SCAD Definitions
Organized Demonstrations: Distinct, continuous, and largely peaceful action directed to-
ward members of a distinct “other” group or government authorities. In this event, clear leadership
or organization(s) can be identified. Spontaneous Demonstration: Distinct, continuous, and
largely peaceful action directed toward members of a distinct “other” group or government au-
thorities. In this event, clear leadership or organization cannot be identified. Organized Violent
Riot: Distinct, continuous and violent action directed toward members of a distinct “other” group
or government authorities. The participants intend to cause physical injury and/or property dam-
age. In this event, clear leadership or organization(s) can be identified. Spontaneous Violent
Riot: Distinct, continuous and violent action directed toward members of a distinct “other” group
or government authorities. The participants intend to cause physical injury and/or property dam-
age. In this event, clear leadership or organization(s) cannot be identified. Anti-Government
Violence: Distinct violent event waged primarily by a non-state group against government au-
thorities or symbols of government authorities (e.g., transportation or other infrastructures). As
distinguished from riots, the anti-government actor must have a semi-permanent or permanent
militant wing or organization.
2. Appendix: Nightlight as a measure of economic development in locations of
fighting versus protest.
Nightlight data is increasingly used to measure economic development in areas where little or
no survey or census data exists about individuals’ income or regional development (Min, 2015;
Weidmann and Schutte, 2017). If our assumption holds, we should see that locations of protest

























































































































Figure A1. Left panel: Boxplot compares nightlight exposure between GED fight-
ing locations and SCAD locations. Right panel: Density plot compares nightlight
exposure between GED fighting locations and SCAD locations.
We assign nightlight exposure data to SCAD and UCDP-GED events using DMSP-OLS Night-
time Lights Time Series provided by the PRIO-GRID project (Tollefsen, Strand and Buhaug,
32012). The PRIO-GRID project provides global data coverage on a 25 × 25km resolution for a
large number of geo-spatial measures. We project the SCAD and UCDP-GED events onto the
PRIO-GRID, extract the corresponding grid’s mean nightlight value and assign it to the respec-
tive events. Using this procedure, we attain nightlight measures for all SCAD and UCDP-GED
events, which we we compare in Figure A1. The left panel in Figure A1 compares the nightlight
exposure between SCAD and UCDP-GED events using box plots, while the right panel provides
more insights to the actual distribution of nightlight exposure in the two datasets. In line with our
expectations, on average SCAD events are recorded in locations with higher nightlight exposure,
which implies higher levels of economic development and urbanization compared to UCDP-GED
event locations. The demonstrated differences are significantly different at standard levels of
statistical significance (differences in mean t-test p≤0.01).
3. Appendix: Probing the impact of GED events on SCAD events
Our theoretical model also provides empirical implications on the impact of GED events on
SCAD events. We argue that strong rebel organizations are more likely to signal that middle-class
individuals are facing a weak government, which leads individuals outside of the rebels’ core to
engage in anti-government behavior. Hence, we should observe that sustained fighting events,
which arguably only strong rebels can engage in, are associated with an increase in protest,
demonstration, and riot events. Using our yearly conflict dataset, we test whether changes in
our measure of rebel organization strength impacts on SCAD event count. We include our three
measures of rebel strength in the analysis.
We estimate five different models to estimate not only the effect of GED events on SCAD events,
but also evaluate the robustness of the relationship. First, we estimate a basic negative binomial
model controlling for GDP per capita, total population, Polity scores, count of other ongoing
conflicts in the country, government military expenditure per capita, and conflict duration.1 In the
second model we include the lagged dependent variable (DV-lag) and in the third model country-
fixed effects (FE). The fourth is a DV-lag FE model and in the final model we estimate a negative
binomial random effects model. The results are reported in Table A1 and demonstrate that only
changes in the number of PRIO-grids affected by fighting events between the government and
rebel organizations have a positive effect on the number of SCAD events. This empirical pattern
is consistent with the idea that rebel organizations that can sustain or maintain high intensity
conflict with the government are more likely to trigger broader anti-government behavior.
4. Appendix: Proofs
A Markov perfect equilibrium is a subgame perfect equilibrium in which strategies depend only
on the payoff relevant state of the game and not on time index or history. The only payoff relevant
state in our model is pit, beliefs about the probability α = αh. Consider strategies that depend only
on beliefs about the probability α = αh. We will refer such strategies as threshold strategies. An
equilibrium in threshold strategies is a Markov perfect equilibrium. There exists a Markov perfect
equilibrium in our game. For example, pil = pim = piu = pie = 1 is a Markov perfect equilibrium.
According to these threshold strategies, no agent participates in rebel activities and the elite does
not concede when pi < 1. Since participation is costly and an agent’s participation does not change
the continuation game, not participating is optimal when other agents do not participate in rebel
activities. Then it is optimal for the elite not to concede when there is no participation.
Since yl = 0, there is no opportunity cost of participating in rebel activities for lower-class
agents. Participation may induce concession in the future, which benefits lower-class agents.
Therefore pil = 0 is always optimal for them. So, we will focus on equilibria with pil = 0. Also,
1Measurement and sourced of all variables discussed in the previous analyses
4Table A1. Negative binomial models assessing the relationship between changes
in measures of rebel organization strength (Capital distance, PRIO grids affected,
and event count) and current SCAD event counts.
Base Model DV-lag Model FE Model FE DV-lag Model RE Model
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Intercept −13.962∗∗∗ −8.344∗∗ 176.435∗∗ 184.320∗∗ −16.241∗∗∗
(2.715) (2.775) (64.997) (64.049) (3.420)
∆GED Event Count −0.000 −0.003 −0.002 −0.001 −0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆GED Capital Distance −0.001 −0.000 −0.001 −0.001∗ −0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
∆GED PRIO grids affected 0.025∗ 0.033∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗
(0.013) (0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
GDP per capitat−1(log) 0.491∗ 0.343 3.737∗∗∗ 4.047∗∗∗ 0.597∗
(0.194) (0.187) (0.816) (0.801) (0.253)
Populationt−1(log) 0.746∗∗∗ 0.400∗ −11.992∗∗ −12.577∗∗ 0.880∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.178) (3.987) (3.933) (0.211)
Xpolityt−1 0.201∗∗∗ 0.113 0.240 0.250∗ 0.149∗
(0.060) (0.061) (0.128) (0.127) (0.074)
Conflict Duration −0.020 −0.001 0.267∗∗ 0.285∗∗ −0.026∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.102) (0.101) (0.013)
Ongoing Conflicts 0.037 0.077 −0.372 −0.293 −0.536
(0.294) (0.277) (0.529) (0.509) (0.455)
Military Expenditure per capitat−1 −8.682 −6.805 −9.062 −8.620 −8.639
(4.657) (4.370) (6.740) (6.657) (5.502)
SCAD Eventst−1 0.130∗∗∗ −0.030
(0.027) (0.027)
AIC 522.939 508.087 501.638 106.000 515.250
BIC 554.311 542.312 649.944 257.158 552.326
Log Likelihood -250.469 -242.044 -198.819 0.000 -244.625
Deviance 137.742 135.046 136.444 141.417





Num. groups: PAID.factor 42
Num. groups: year.factor 21
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
c < (1−δ)yu implies that life time benefit of a concession to an upper-class opposition agent is less
than the income that he has to give up in order to participate in rebel activities, so upper-class
opposition will never participate in rebel activities, i.e. piu = 1. In the rest of the appendix, we
will characterize equilibria with pil = 0 and piu = 1.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. If no middle-class opposition participates in equilibrium, then it is optimal for the elite to
not concede, so pim = pie = 1 and pim ≤ pie holds in this equilibrium. Consider any other threshold
equilibrium with pim < 1. Suppose that pie < pim. Consider the elite strategy at the threshold
belief pi = pie. If the elite plays according to the threshold pie, then it concedes when pi = pie and
its payoff is −c. Consider an alternative strategy of not conceding this period and conceding next
period. Since pie < pim, the middle-class agents do not participate in rebel activities this period.
So, the maximum expected cost from a rebel activity this period is αhλlψ < c. The elite bears
5the cost of c from concession from the next period on. So the maximum cost of the alternative
strategy is (1− δ)αhλlψ + δc. That is the elite’s minimum expected payoff from this strategy can
be computed as
−(1− δ)αhλlψ − δc
If the elite concedes today, his payoff is −c. Since
−(1− δ)αhλlψ − δc > −c
equivalently αhλlψ < c, this is a profitable deviation. This is a contradiction, therefore pie < pim
cannot hold in equilibrium. This completes the proof. 
Given thresholds pil, pim, pie, let Uω(pi) be the expected payoff of ω-class opposition agents when
the belief is given by pi and they play according to the threshold piω. Similarly let Ue(pi) be the
elite’s expected payoffs, given the threshold strategies and the belief.
The payoffs from threshold strategies can be written recursively. Given a common belief pi,
α(pi) = piαh + (1 − pi)αl is the expected probability of success. Agents update their beliefs as
follows. If people observe a successful rebel activity, then
pi′(pi) =
piαh
piαh + (1− pi)αl ≡ pi
s(pi) > pi
and if they do not observe a failure, then
pi′(pi) =
pi(1− αh)
pi(1− αh) + (1− pi)(1− αl) ≡ pi
f (pi) < pi
Consider player strategies that are given by the thresholds pil = 0, piu = 1, pim and pie ≥ pim. λ
is the size of the participants in rebel activities, which is induced by the belief pi:
λ(pi) =
{
λl if pi < pim
λl + λm if pi ≥ pim
The payoff to the elite from playing the threshold strategy pie ≥ pim can be computed recursively
as follows:
Ue(pi) =
 −(1− δ)α(pi)λlψ + δEUe(pi
′(pi)) if pi < pim
−(1− δ)α(pi)(λl + λm)ψ + δEUe(pi′(pi)) if pim ≤ pi < pie
−c if pi ≥ pie
where
EUe(pi
′(pi)) = α(pi)Ue(pis(pi)) + (1− α(pi))Ue(pif (pi))
is the expected continuation payoff from the next period on.
The first line in Ue(pi) is the elite’s payoff when beliefs are low, pi < pim, so that the middle-
class does not participate in rebel activities. The first term is the expected cost from lower-class
activities and the second term is the expected payoff from tomorrow on. Given the current period
beliefs pi, the activities succeed with probability α(pi) and the beliefs are updated to pis(pi) the
next period so that the elite’s continuation payoff is given by Ue(pi
s(pi)). The activities fail with
probability 1−α(pi); in this case the beliefs are updated to Ue(pif (pi)) and the elite’s continuation
payoff is given by Ue(pi
f (pi)). Therefore, the expected payoff EUe(pi
′(pi)) is calculated as above.
The second line in Ue(pi) is the elite’s payoff when beliefs are such that pim ≤ pi < pie so that
both lower and middle-classes participate in rebel activities but the elite does not concede. The
expected cost of the activities becomes −(1− δ)α(pi)(λl + λm)ψ in this case. Finally, the third is





6be the limit payoff to the elite when the beliefs approach to the elite’s threshold from below. If
uthreshold < −c, the elite can increase their payoff by slightly lowering their threshold. Similarly,
if wthreshold > −c, the elite can improve their payoff by slightly increasing their threshold. So,
optimality requires that
uthreshold = −c
The payoff function of the middle-class opposition agents, Um(pi), can be computed similarly as
Um(pi) =
 (1− δ)yh + δEUm(pi
′(pi)) if pi < pim
δEUm(pi
′(pi)) if pim ≤ pi < pie
yh + c if pi ≥ pie
where
EUm(pi
′(pi)) = α(pi)Um(pis(pi)) + (1− α(pi))Um(pif (pi))
When pi ≥ pim, the threshold strategy dictates participation by a middle class agent. Alternatively,
he can choose not to participate. In this case, given the strategies of other players, nobody will
participate in rebellious activities any longer so there will be no concession in the future. So, her
continuation payoff from such deviation is yh. Therefore, optimality of pim implies that
Um(pim) = δEUm(pi
′(pim)) ≥ yh
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Suppose that there exists an equilibrium with pil = 0, piu = 1 and pim < 1. Then pim ≤ pie
by Proposition 1. To the contrary, suppose that the elite does not concede in the equilibrium, i.e.
pie = 1. Then Ue can be written recursively as follows:
Ue(pi) =
 −(1− δ)α(pi)λlψ + δEUe(pi
′(pi)) if pi < pim
−(1− δ)α(pi)(λl + λm)ψ + δEUe(pi′(pi)) if pim ≤ pi < 1
−c if pi = 1
where
EUe(pi
′(pi)) = α(pi)Ue(pis(pi)) + (1− α(pi))Ue(pif (pi))
We can prove that Ue(pi) ≥ Ue(pi′) for all pi < pi′ < 1 as follows. Start with a function Wn such
that Wn(pi) ≥ Wn(pi′) for all pi < pi′ < 1. Produce Wn+1 as follows:
Wn+1(pi) =
 −(1− δ)α(pi)λlψ + δEWn(pi
′(pi)) if pi < pim
−(1− δ)α(pi)(λl + λm)ψ + δEWn(pi′(pi)) if pim ≤ pi < 1
−c if pi = 1
where
EWn(pi
′(pi)) = α(pi)Wn(pis(pi)) + (1− α(pi))Wn(pif (pi))
Wn+1 satisfies Wn+1(pi) ≥ Wn+1(pi′) for all pi < pi′ < 1 and Wn converges to Ue as n goes to infinity.
So Ue(pi) ≥ Ue(pi′) for all pi < pi′ < 1 is satisfied in the limit.
Consider pi = 1 − ε > pim for ε positive and arbitrarily small. Then pis(pi) and pif (pi) are
arbitrarily close to 1 and α(pi), α(pis(pi)) and α(pif (pi)) are arbitrarily close to αh. Also
Ue(pi) = −(1− δ)α(pi)(λl + λm)ψ + δEUe(pi′(pi))
where
EUe(pi
′(pi)) = α(pi)Ue(pis(pi)) + (1− α(pi))Ue(pif (pi)) ≤ Ue(pif (pi)) ≤ −α(pif (pi))λlψ
The first inequality follows from pif (pi) < pis(pi) so that Ue(pi
f (pi)) > Ue(pi
s(pi)) as proven above.
The second inequality follows from the fact that α(pif (pi))λlψ is a lower bound for the cost that
the elite bears when the beliefs are given by pif (pi). This lower bound is achieved when only the
lower-class participates in rebel activities forever. Note that the lower-class always participates
7in rebel activities since pil = 0, so this cost is accounted for in Ue(pi
f (pi)). In addition, Ue(pi
f (pi))
accounts for the costs of middle-class participation so that Ue(pi
f (pi)) ≤ −α(pif (pi))λlψ.
Substitute EUe(pi
′(pi)) ≤ −α(pif (pi))λlψ in the expression of Ue(pi) above to obtain
Ue(pi) ≤ −(1− δ)α(pi)(λl + λm)ψ − δα(pif (pi))λlψ
pif (pi) goes to 1 and α(pi) goes to αh as pi goes to 1. So the right hand side of this inequality goes
to −αhψ(λl + (1 − δ)λm) as pi goes to 1. By Assumption 5, αhψ(λl + (1 − δ)λm) > c. So there
exists a positive and small enough ε such that
Ue(pi) ≤ −(1− δ)α(pi)(λl + λm)ψ − δα(pif (pi))λlψ ≈ −αhψ(λl + (1− δ)λm) < −c
This implies that the payoff from concession when pi = 1 − ε is higher than the payoff from no
concession at all. Therefore pie = 1 cannot be a best response to pim < 1. 
The following proposition is a middle step before the existence proof. It asserts that if pim is
close to 1, then the elite’s best response is pie = pim, i.e. the elite concedes exactly when the
middle-class participates.
Proposition 1. Let pie be best response for the ruling elite. Then pie = pim for some pim < 1.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let pie be a best response to pim < 1. Then pim ≤ pie < 1 by Propositions 1 and 2. Suppose
that pim < pie for all pim < 1. Consider pim = 1 − ε for a positive and arbitrarily small ε and
pi = pim +  for  such that pi ∈ (pim, pie). Then
Ue(pi) = −(1− δ)α(pi)(λl + λm)ψ + δEW (pi′(pi))
where
EUe(pi
′(pi)) = α(pi)Ue(pis(pi)) + (1− α(pi))Ue(pif (pi)) ≤ Ue(pif (pi))
As in the proof of Proposition 2, Ue(pi
f (pi)) ≤ −α(pif (pi))λlψ implies
Ue(pi) ≤ −(1− δ)α(pi)(λl + λm)ψ − δα(pif (pi))λlψ
pif (pi) goes to 1 and α(pi) goes to αh as pi goes to 1. If we choose ε arbitrarily small, the right hand
side of this inequality goes to −αhψ(λl + (1 − δ)λm) as pi goes to 1. By assumption −αhψ(λl +
(1− δ)λm) > c. So, there exists a positive and small enough ε such that
Ue(pi) ≤ −(1− δ)α(pi)(λl + λm)ψ − δα(pif (pi))λlψ ≈ −αhψ(λl + (1− δ)λm) < −c
So the payoff from concession when pi = pim is higher than the payoff from not conceding when
pi = pim. Therefore pim < pie for all pim < 1 cannot hold, so that pie = pim for large enough
pim < 1. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Consider any pim < 1 such that the elite’s best response satisfies pie = pim. Such pim exists
by Proposition 1. We will prove that (pil = 0, piu = 1, pim, pie = pim) is an equilibrium. Since pie
is a best response to pim, we only need to prove that pim is also a best response. Suppose that
middle-class agents participate when pi ≥ pim. Given the strategies of all other agents, consider a
middle-class opposition agent. If he participates when pi ≥ pim, then the elite concedes and the
agent achieves an extra payoff of c forever. If he does not participate, nobody will participate in
rebel activities forever, and anticipating this, the elite will not concede because the elite would
suffer the cost of rebellious activities for just one period, which is less than the cost of concession
by Assumption 4. This means that the middle-class agent would save the one period income of
ym but lose the life-long stream of c by not participating. Since (1 − δ)ym < c by Assumption
83, the middle-class agent would be worse off by not participating. Therefore, participation when
pi = pim is a best response for the agent given that the other middle-class agents in the opposition
also follow the pim threshold strategy, so a non-trivial equilibrium with pim ≤ pie < 1 exists. 
Proposition 2. The elite’s best response threshold strategy is a non-decreasing function of the
opposition’s threshold strategy.
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let pie be the elite’s best responses to the opposition’s threshold strategy pim. For any
pie ≥ pim, Ue can be computed recursively as follows:
Ue(pi) =
 −(1− δ)α(pi)λlψ + δEUe(pi
′(pi)) if pi < pim
−(1− δ)α(pi)(λl + λm)ψ + δEUe(pi′(pi)) if pim ≤ pi < pie
−c if pi ≥ pie
As we argued above, optimality in equilibrium requires that lim
pi↑pie
Ue(pi) = −c. If pim increases, then
Ue(pi) increases for all pi < pie and lim
pi↑pie
Ue(pi) > −c holds. This implies that the elite’s best response
increases with pim. 
Proposition 3 asserts existence of equilibrium with middle-class participation in rebel activities.
However, there may be multiple such equilibria. We define a minimum threshold equilibrium









l = 0, pi
′
u = 1 and pi
′
m < pim. By definition a minimum threshold equilibrium
is unique. It is also interesting from a substantive point of view because concession is obtained
the earliest in that equilibrium. We compute the minimum threshold equilibrium numerically for
various parameter values.
95. Appendix: Tables
Table B1. Summary statistics for yearly peace agreement analysis.
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Conflict Duration 137 10.796 11.469 2 40
Anti-government SCAD Events 137 2.358 3.447 0 21
GED fighting events count 137 42.416 50.314 1 286
Mean GED Capital Distance 137 513.207 386.814 3.986 1,309.770
Prio Grids affected by GED Fighting Events 137 13.723 13.832 1 78
GDP per capita 137 6.778 0.650 4.764 7.823
Population 137 16.352 0.863 14.605 17.775
Xpolity 137 −1.285 1.948 −3 5
Conflict Duration 137 25.555 11.347 1 43
Other conflicts 137 1.204 0.405 1 2
Military Expenditure per capita 137 0.017 0.037 −0.00000 0.329
Table B2. Proportionality test for Model 1 (Table 1). Testing a non-zero slope of
Schoenfeld residuals as a function of time, where ρ if the coefficient of the slope. A
χ2 test is used as a statistical test of whether ρ is different from zero. All p-values
indicate that we cannot reject the null hypothesis, which indicates that the model
does not violate the proportionality assumption.
ρ χ2 p
SCAD Eventst−1 0.074 0.221 0.638
GED Event Countt−1 0.059 0.087 0.768
GED Capital Distancet−1 0.076 0.107 0.743
GED PRIO grids affectedt−1 0.176 0.822 0.365
GDP per capitat−1(log) −0.103 0.338 0.561
Populationt−1(log) −0.112 0.435 0.510
Xpolityt−1 −0.034 0.047 0.829
Conflict Duration −0.014 0.011 0.917
Ongoing Conflicts −0.109 0.255 0.613
Military expenditure per capitat−1 −0.183 0.619 0.432
GLOBAL 1.727 0.998
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Table B3. Peace Agreement Models. Cox proportional hazard model estimates.
Outcome variable is the time to peace agreement. Model includes all relevant vari-
ables interacted with the log of time.
Dependent variable:
Time to peace agreement
Model 1 Model 2
SCAD Eventst−1 0.206∗∗∗ 0.310∗∗
(0.089) (0.138)
SCAD Eventst−1×ln(time) −0.187∗∗∗ −0.244∗
(0.103) (0.158)
GED Event Countt−1 −0.014
(0.013)
GED Event Countt−1×ln(time) 0.008
(0.007)
GED Capital Distancet−1 −0.001
(0.002)
GED Capital Distancet−1×ln(time) 0.0001
(0.001)
GED PRIO grids affectedt−1 0.019
(0.066)
GED PRIO grids affectedt−1×ln(time) −0.004
(0.034)










Military expenditure per capitat−1 6.714∗
(5.857)
Observations 153 137
Log Likelihood -103.459 -92.449
Wald Test 55.750∗∗∗ (df = 2) 617.460∗∗∗ (df = 14)
LR Test 5.566 (df = 2) 15.636 (df = 14)
Score (Logrank) Test 6.311∗ (df = 2) 15.083 (df = 14)
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table B4. Negotiation onset model: Logit regression estimates for the negotiation
onset model including all relevant variables interacted with the month count (time)





SCAD Eventst−1×Month in Episode −0.010∗∗
(0.004)
GED Event Countt−1 0.019
(0.065)
GED Event Countt−1×Month in Episode −0.0002
(0.001)
GED Capital Distancet−1 0.001
(0.0004)
GED Capital Distancet−1×Month in Episode −0.00000
(0.00001)
GED PRIO grids affectedt−1 0.043
(0.114)



















Month in Episode 0.044∗∗
(0.017)
Month in Episode2 −0.001∗
(0.0002)








Count Rebel Organizations 0.330∗
(0.158)












Akaike Inf. Crit. 931.861
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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Table B5. Negotiation onset and outcome models: Logit regression estimates
(Model 1) for the negotiation onset model. Table also provides Negative Bino-
mial regression estimates for the strong number of concessions model (Model 2) and
the weak concessions model (Model 3).
Dependent variable:
Negotiation onset Number of strong concessions Number of weak concessions
logistic negative negative
binomial binomial
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
SCAD Eventst−1 0.665∗∗∗ 0.812∗∗ 0.631∗
(0.200) (0.283) (0.265)
SCAD Eventst−1×Month in Episode −0.010∗∗ −0.010 −0.009∗
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
GED Event Countt−1 0.011 −0.068 −0.048
(0.034) (0.050) (0.043)
GED Capital Distancet−1 0.001∗ 0.0004 0.001∗
(0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004)





Successt1×Month in Episode −0.013∗∗ −0.014∗ −0.017∗∗
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
Rebel Strength 0.623∗∗∗ 0.928∗∗∗ 0.805∗∗∗
(0.149) (0.206) (0.183)
Main Group 0.598 −0.043 −0.212
(0.329) (0.419) (0.379)
Rebel Support 0.944∗∗∗ 0.655∗ 0.742∗∗
(0.223) (0.308) (0.277)
Polity 0.123∗∗∗ 0.096∗ 0.077
(0.034) (0.049) (0.042)
Battle Deaths (log) −0.056 0.229 0.281∗
(0.092) (0.130) (0.115)
Episode −1.150∗∗ −0.602 −0.693
(0.376) (0.443) (0.406)
Month in Episode 0.042∗ 0.020 0.018
(0.016) (0.023) (0.020)
Month in Episode2 −0.001∗ −0.0003 −0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Month in Episode3 0.00000∗ 0.00000 0.00000
(0.00000) (0.00000) (0.00000)
Territorial Conflict −0.157 0.507 0.670
(0.713) (0.978) (0.828)
Ethnic Conflict 1.357∗∗∗ 0.182 0.309
(0.286) (0.336) (0.306)
Third Party 1.799∗∗∗ 0.714 0.846∗
(0.383) (0.423) (0.369)
Count rebel organizations 0.325∗ 0.399 0.093
(0.157) (0.231) (0.206)
GDP per capita 0.0004∗∗ 0.001∗∗ 0.0005∗∗
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Population −0.000 −0.00000∗∗ −0.00000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.00000) (0.000)
Military expenditure per capita 2.419 0.950 0.071
(2.566) (3.580) (3.145)
Ongoing Conflicts 1.022∗ 0.462 0.813
(0.443) (0.655) (0.561)
Intercept −7.983∗∗∗ −7.703∗∗∗ −7.563∗∗∗
(1.057) (1.366) (1.204)
Observations 1,364 1,364 1,364
Log Likelihood -438.483 -356.386 -453.436
θ 0.174∗∗∗ (0.039) 0.211∗∗∗ (0.041)
Akaike Inf. Crit. 926.965 762.772 956.871
Note: ∗p<0.05; ∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗p<0.001
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